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Abstract: A drastic change in the marketing system of wheat in South Africa has 
taken place over the past decade. For the first time an import tariff on wheat was 
implemented in the form of a variable import levy. Traditionally, countries have 
implemented variable import levy schemes in order to protect domestic price 
guarantees by means of determining a reference price, which was generally above the 
domestic guaranteed price, below which imports were not allowed into the country. In 
this paper the efficiency of the Wheat Tariff Regime in South Africa is examined, 
after it has been operational for the past seven years. 
 
1.  Introduction 
Wheat is the most important grain c rop in South Africa after maize and interestingly, 
the past decade has brought about a shift in the style of wheat marketing characterized 
by the transformation of a highly regulated dispensation to an essentially free one. As 
a result, the phasing out of  the Wheat Board in 1997 has ensured that wheat producers 
are increasingly being exposed to international wheat markets. In addition, the 
economic policy in South Africa has changed dramatically, accompanying the almost 
global movement towards deregulation  and liberalisation of the economy; resulting in 
a more market-based approach to both agricultural and macro-economic policy. 
Drastic adjustments to the marketing system of wheat took place and for the first time 
an import tariff on wheat was implemented in the form of a variable import levy, 
which was, and still is calculated according to the formula that is determined by the 
Board of Tariffs and Trade (BTT). In this paper, after reviewing the theoretical basis 
for a variable import levy scheme, the efficiency of the variable import levy scheme 




2.  Policy trends in the Wheat Sector  
The South African agricultural sector has experienced a long history of state 
intervention. Figure 2.3 below, summarises the main historical events and 
deregulatory activities impacting on the wheat to bread value chain (NAMC, 1999). 
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The Marketing Acts of 1937 and 1968 respectively, provided the impetus for a period 
of sixty years characterized by the controlled marketing of the major agricultural 
industries. Under the auspices of “orderly marketing” a single marketing channel was 
established with agricultural cooperatives acting as agents for the marketing boards. 
Under the single channel marketing scheme, wheat farmers were guaranteed a fixed 
producer price at the beginning of the season, irrespective of the transactions costs 
incurred due to varying distances to final destinations for the delivery of products. 
This fixed producer price was set as follows: the Wheat Board would propose a basic 
price, this proposal was sent to the minister for approval, once a basic price was 
approved, the producer price was calculated by deducting the storage costs from the 
basic price. The basic price was determined by the previous year’s basic price, adding 












Figure 1: History and deregulation of the Wheat-to-Bread Value Chain (Source: 
NAMC, 1999) 
 
During the early 1980’s a general decline in the use of price c ontrols occurred with a 
shift towards market-based pricing systems. GATT negotiations enhanced pressure 
for the abolition of quantitative import controls and the introduction of tariffs on 
agricultural commodities. In 1994 the Minister of Agriculture appointed a special 
committee to advise on a framework for and the implementation of a future 
agricultural marketing policy. The report recommended that an urgent solution be 






1939 the implementation of an import tariff. The Wheat Forum was established and May 
1994 was set as the target date by which the  finalisation of aspects in view of 
submitting a tariff application to the department of trade and industry. Although 
import tariffs formally replaced quantitative import controls already in 1995, it was 
not until February 1998 that the first import tariff was implemented. After reviewing 
the theoretical basis for variable import levies in the following section, the nature of 
the wheat tariff regime will be discussed in more detail.  
 
 
3.  Theoretical Basis for a Variable Import Levy Scheme 
Tariffs and quotas are the traditional mechanisms by which governments of importing 
nations intervene to protect their domestic producers from foreign c ompetition. In 
many countries these intervention mechanism are introduced to protect internal price 
guarantees, which are often higher than free markets will deliver. Over time it became 
evident that tariffs and quotas have certain operational drawbacks. F ixed and ad 
valorem tariffs allow fluctuations in world prices to be transmitted fully or partly into 
the domestic market. Although binding import quotas insulate the domestic market 
from world price changes, this insulation could lead to the amplification of domestic 
price swings caused by internal demand and supply fluctuations (Houck, 1987). 
 
Over the years a number of policy schemes have been devised to overcome the 
shortcomings of the conventional intervention mechanisms. When the South African 
Wheat F orum submitted a tariff application in 1994, it opted for one of these 
“improved import products”, namely the variable import levy scheme. Figure 1 below 
depicts a partial equilibrium view of a basic variable import levy scheme, introduced 
by a small importing nation; therefore, the excess supply (ES) faced by this nation is 
perfectly elastic.  
 
The starting point for the implementation of a variable levy is to set a reference price 
(threshold price) (PR) high enough to protect the domestic subsidised price. The 
introduction of the variable import levy scheme produces the adjusted excess demand 
curve (ED*) of an importing nation. ED* is the original ED curve from point e to 
point b, and then has a vertical segment from point b down to point m. The reason for 
this vertical segment is that imports cannot enter the country at a price lower than the reference price. Hence, imports are limited to om = sd. If no protective trade policy 
were employed, the internal market price would decrease to the level of the world 
price (PW) and imports would increase to ow. At P W, the “gap” between the world 
price and the reference price (PR) is exactly bridged by the import levy (bd). The 
import levy varies as the difference between the reference price and the world price 
varies. If the world price should move above the reference price, the variable levy 
scheme would cease to operate because open market prices without protection would 
be above the reference price. Once in operation, the variable levy effectively 
disconnects domestic prices of affected imports from international prices. Similar to 
fixed or ad valorem tariffs, revenues may be generated for the central authority. At 
PW, abdc = C represents the revenue to the central authority. As world prices fall, 
revenues increase, since the per-unit levy increases, and imports remain unchanged, 
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Figure 1: Variable Levy Scheme 
 
The welfare effects of variable import levies are similar to those with ordinary tariffs 
and quotas. Producers enjoy the high price guarantees, which are protected by the 
import levy and producer surplus increases by A. However, it is also possible that 
producers could adversely be affected by this trade policy, since price stability may be 
associated with increased potential for farm income instability as domestic supplies 
fluctuate from season to season. Over time, stable price guarantees could induce a 
higher level of domestic production as producers respond to higher prices and 
increase their acreage. B represents some of the value lost by consumers that goes to 
sellers of variable inputs in order for the expansion in domestic production to take 
place. Consumers are worse off, since they have to pay more for their product, and 
consumer surplus decreases by A+B+C+D. I mporters will also have to pay more for their products and, therefore, are worse off. Furthermore, social losses occur in the 
small nation because internal prices are elevated above the free trade level and limited 
trade flows do not increase the level of  the world price. D represents 
social/deadweight losses. No one in the society picks up this area in the redistribution. 
The rest of the world will not be affected by this protective trade policy, since a small 
nation faces a perfectly elastic supply curve, which implies that world prices do not 
change as the quantity of imports change.   
 
4.  Nuts and Bolts of the Wheat Tariff Regime 
At the time (1994) the Wheat Forum submitted their tariff application to the 
Department of Trade and Industry, wheat was trading  on the world market at prices 
above $200/ton. The Forum set the first reference price at $194/ton (Exchange rate 
R3.69 for US $1). A variable import levy would be introduced if world prices would 
drop below the reference price. In the years that followed t he world price decreased 
drastically to a level of $110/ton in 1999. A new reference price was set at $157/ton 
(Exchange rate R6.11 for US $1), and a new import levy of R181/ton was calculated. 
This reference price is still used for the current calculation of the variable import levy. 
The calculation of the levy is based on the Hard Red Wheat (No.2) price in the USA. 
To calculate subsequent adjustments to the level of protection, the difference between 
the world price, on which the previous adjustment was b ased (base price), and the 
three-week moving average of the same price will be calculated on a weekly basis. 
When this deviation amounts to more than US $10/ton for three consecutive weeks, a 
new levy can be calculated, and a new base price will be set.    
 
The calculation of the import levy on September 3, 2002, as presented in table 1, will 
be used to illustrate the practical operation of the variable import levy scheme. On 
September 3, the three-week moving average price was calculated at $170/ton, and 
the base price at $152.67(world price on which the adjustment was based on July 23), 
which amounts to a deviation of $17.33/ton. For three consecutive weeks the 
deviation had been greater than $10/ton, therefore, an adjustment to the levy could be 
calculated. A negative duty on wheat of R139.04=(157-170)*10.6952 was calculated. 
The new base price was set at $170/ton ($152.67 + $17.33) and in the week that 
followed the import levy ceased to operate.  
 Lastly, no import permit is required to import wheat. 
 
5.  Efficiency of the Variable Import Levy Scheme  
Before the Uruguay Round the European Community chose variable import levies as 
the method to protect their domestic intervention system against cheaper imports 
(Ritson and Harvey, 1997). When the Wheat Forum opted for a variable import levy 
scheme, it was already aware of the fact that there would be no domestic subsidised 
price, which needs protection from cheaper imports. Therefore, the levy was 
introduced to protect producers from imports when the world price  of wheat (US No2 
HRW fob Gulf) would decrease below a level of $157/ton (reference price). It was 
argued that producers would not need protection, and consumer prices would be too 
high, if a levy were introduced at prices above the level of $157/ton.   
 
However, close examination of the calculation of the import levy reveals that 
producers, were not, and will not be protected at the reference price level, under the 
current import regime. Furthermore, levies were, and will also be introduced at price 
levels  higher than the reference price. The reason for this phenomenon is the formula, 
which is used to calculate the levy, and specifically, the additional specification that 
the three-week moving average price has to deviate from the base price by more than 
$10/ton for three consecutive weeks. Table 1 below represents the calculation of the 
import tariff at specific periods of time over the past two years.  
 
On April 30, 2002 a duty on wheat of R347.43/ton was calculated, therefore, a duty 
that ensured an import price equal to $157/ton ($124.33 + $32.67). Yet the published 
levy could not be adjusted to this calculated level, since the deviation from the basis 
price was smaller than $10/ton and an import levy of R196/ton was published. We can 
refer to this levy as the effective import levy. When the effective import levy is 
divided by the exchange rate and added to the moving average price of three weeks, 
an import price of $142.76/ton ($124.33 + $18.43) is calculated. This calculation 
proves that the imports could enter the country at a world price that is lower than the 
reference price.   
Table 1: Calculation of the Variable Import Levy 
Week  
ending 




























weeks  wheat  rate  wheat   
  $/Ton  $/Ton  $/Ton  $/Ton    $/Ton  R  R/Ton  R/Ton 
2002/04/30  121.00  124.33  130.33  6.00    32.67  10.6344  347.43  196.00 
2002/06/25  137.00  134.00  130.33  -3.67    23.00  10.3500  238.05  196.00 
2002/07/02  144.00  138.33  130.33  -8.00    18.67  10.0604  187.83  196.00 
2002/07/09  148.00  143.00  130.33  -12.67  1  14.00  9.9990  139.99  196.00 
2002/07/16  154.00  148.67  130.33  -18.34  2  8.33  10.0806  83.97  196.00 
2002/07/23  156.00  152.67  130.33  -22. 34  3  4.33  10.0604  43.56  196.00 
2002/07/30  154.00  154.67  152.67  -2.00    2.33  10.1112  23.56  43.56 
2002/08/06  161.00  157.00  152.67  -4.33    0.00  10.5708  0.00  43.56 
2002/08/13  168.00  161.00  152.67  -8.33    -4.00  10.5597  -42.24  43.56 
2002/08/20  161.00  163.33  152.67  -10.66  1  -6.33  10.6610  -67.48  43.56 
2002/08/27  171.00  166.67  152.67  -14.00  2  -9.67  10.6045 
-
102.55  43.56 
2002/09/03  178.00  170.00  152.67  -17.33  3  -13.00  10.6952 
-
139.04  43.56 
2002/09/11  197.00  182.00  170.00  -12.00  1  -25.00  10.4932 
-
262.33  0.00 
 
During the past six months the world price for wheat increased drastically to reach a 
level of more than $200/ton. The specific time periods, in which the recalculation of 
the import levy took place, are presented in table 1. On July 23, a new levy of 
R43.56/ton was calculated and published in the following week. The new base price 
was set at $152.67/ton ($130.33 + $22.34). For three consecutive weeks the world 
price for wheat continued to increase, but at a rate that amounted to a deviation less 
than $10/ton  from the new basis price. By the middle of August the world price had 
increased to $161/ton, a negative duty on wheat of R42.24/ton was calculated, but still 
the published import levy remained at R43.56/ton. Again, the deviation had not 
reached the critical level of $10/ton, which implied that imports could only enter the 
country at a price, which on this occasion was higher than the reference price 
(R43.56/10.5597 + $161.00 = $165.12). 
 
In the following weeks the world price continued to increase, but now  at a rate that 
was sufficient to let the three-week moving average price deviate from the base price 
by more than $10/ton. It was only on September 11 that the variable import levy 
scheme ceased to operate and wheat could be imported at the prevailing world price 
levels without any intervention mechanism. It is important to note that if the world price had not increased above a level of $162.67 ($152.67(base price) + $10) the 
import levy would have remained at R43.56/ton.  
 
One can draw the conclusion that  there exists some margin of inefficiency (stickiness) 
in the operation of the current variable import levy regime. In some instances it might 
be the case that the regime does not protect the reference price, and in other cases it 
not only protects the reference price but also increases the minimum price level at 
which wheat can be imported.  
 
6.  Economic Effects 
There are at least two ways to look at the economic effects of a protective trade policy 
in a partial equilibrium context. One is to study the direct  effects on prices, 
production, trade, and consumption, then to identify the groups within the society who 
are likely to benefit or be hurt by the intervention. Another way is to evaluate the 
economic welfare changes that occur (Houck, 1987). Many of the economic effects 
can graphically be illustrate and explained by making use of the graphs, as presented 
in Figure 1. Yet, taking the discussion of the previous section into account, it becomes 
obvious that Figure 1 does not accurately reflect the effect of the variable import levy 
on the wheat market in South Africa. This can be proven by a partial equilibrium view 
of the wheat market on April 30, 2002 in Figure 2.   
 
The difference between the two figures is the adjusted excess demand curve (ED*), 
which contains a second downward sloping segment, which combines point a and c, 
and then only contains the vertical segment cT. The fact that the sum of the world 
price and the import levy (P W+T = $142) is lower than the reference price (PR = $157) 
produces segment a c, which has a steeper slope than the original excess demand 
curve, but is not vertical. Therefore, imports are not limited to 0R = hi, as would be 
the case with the reference price, but to 0T = Lm. If no protective trade policy were in 
place, OS would be  imported into the country. Revenues that are generated by the 
central authority have shifted from gade to fbce. Whether the revenues have increased 
or decreased, depends on the elasticity of the original excess demand curve ED. 
Traditionally, the excess demand curve of small countries can be classified as 
relatively elastic. This implies that the percentage change in quantity is greater than 
the percentage change in price. It is, therefore, evident that the revenues of the central authority have increased w ith the decrease in price. However, it has to be kept in mind 
that this is only for a short period of time. As previously explained, it is possible that 
imports could only enter the country at a world price, which is higher than the 
reference price. If this were the case, then the revenues of the central authority will be 
lower. It can be argued that over a long period of time (4-5 years) the average 
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Figure 2: Partial Equilibrium View of the Wheat Market, April 30 2002  
 
Figure 2 shows that production has decreased by ok (but still higher than production 
at free market prices), and consumption has increased by jn (but still lower than 
consumption at free market prices), due to lower market prices. If it were the case that 
producers received guaranteed prices equal to P W+T, the next logical step would be to 
examine the distribution of welfare through the economy. Yet, in South Africa wheat 
farmers do not receive a guaranteed price, therefore, one needs to ask a critical 
question: What was the internal market price? On April 30, the South African Future 
Exchange (SAFEX) wheat spot price at Randfontein was R1873.23/ton and the import 
parity p rice (delivered at Randfontein) was R1931.88/ton. As previously discussed, 
imports could enter the country on this day at a world price of $142.67/ton. If the 
minimum price for imports were held at the reference price level, the import parity 
price would h ave equated to R2084.21 (R1931.88 + $14.33*10.6344). In a free 
market the import parity price would have been R1735.88/ton. 
 
To carry on with this discussion would by meaningless, since this is only one day in a 
whole marketing season for wheat. One marketing season for wheat is on its turn 
again only one year in a global price cycle for agricultural commodities that could 
stretch over many years.  Although South Africa is a net importer of wheat, whether the domestic price of wheat goes up to the maximum l evel of import parity prices, 
depends on the relative scarcity of wheat in the domestic market. The main harvesting 
period for wheat is from December to the end of January. April is still early in the 
marketing season and the probability is very high that  stocks satisfy domestic 
consumption. It would be dangerous to make the assumption that the “stickiness” of 
the import levy did not influence the market price (SAFEX) at all and, therefore, the 
behaviour of producers and consumers at this stage in the marketing season. This 
matter boils down to the basic notions of price transmission and formation in 
commodity markets.  SAFEX prices for wheat come about as a result of supply and 
demand factors, which include weather conditions, consumer preferences, 
government policy, trade agreements, changes in living standards, technology, and the 
views of different participants in the market about the direction that prices are going 
to take in the future.  
 
The question of causality goes beyond the scope of this study.  The fact remains that 
there exists some sluggishness or stickiness in the calculation of the variable import 
levy of wheat. In Figure 2 above the world price for imports is depicted as $142/ton. 
However, over the long term the world price for wheat imports i nto South Africa 








































Figure 3: Adjusted varying import levy scheme 
 
 
7.  Conclusion 
In this paper the variable import levy scheme of the wheat sector in South Africa was 
closely examined. It was determined that there exists some level of “distortion” in the 
calculation of the levy. It was found that between a specific range of prices ($167-$147) the variable import levy did not succeed in disconnecting the domestic prices  of 
affected imports from international prices. Although some of the effects on the 
economy could be identified, a very important issue remains an empirical question. 
What effect does this “stickiness” in the calculation of the import levy have on the 
market price of wheat, if any? Finally, the reasoning for the calculation of the import 
levy in this unique way needs to be addressed. Firstly, one can imagine that this 
method of calculation reduces the frequency of publishing new levies. This will 
decrease the cost of publishing and ease the burden on importers and exporters, who 
have to price commodities on a daily basis. Secondly, one can argue that although, for 
some phases the world price will be higher than the reference price and for some 
phases it will  be lower than the reference price, the world price will reach an average 
of approximately $157/ton.  
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